The Park Place Economist
Volume 20

Issue 1

Article 13

2012

Electricity: A Cursed Resource?
Devin Long '12
Illinois Wesleyan University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace

Recommended Citation
Long, Devin '12 (2012) "Electricity: A Cursed Resource?," The Park Place
Economist: Vol. 20
Available at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol20/iss1/13
This Article is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital
Commons @ IWU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this material in any
way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For
other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights
are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/ or on the work itself. This material
has been accepted for inclusion by faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.

Electricity: A Cursed Resource?
Abstract
As is well documented in the media, the standard of living in many African countries is extremely low. In
fact, in the most recent edition of the Human Development Report, released by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), thirty-seven of the forty-one countries classified as “low development”
(the lowest ranking on the development scale), are African nations. It is equally well-known that many
African nations are ‘blessed’ with valuable natural resource endowments that should bring enormous
revenues to these countries. The disparity between theory and reality leads one to wonder, why do these
revenues not raise the standard of living for a country’s inhabitants? The natural resource curse
hypothesis attempts to explain why the revenues are not allocated efficiently.
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ELECTRICITY: A CURSED RESOURCE?
Devin Long
I. INTRODUCTION
As is well documented in the media, the
standard of living in many African countries is extremely low. In fact, in the most recent edition of
the Human Development Report, released by the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
thirty-seven of the forty-one countries classified
as “low development” (the lowest ranking on
the development scale), are African nations. It
is equally well-known that many African nations
are ‘blessed’ with valuable natural resource endowments that should bring enormous revenues
to these countries. The disparity between theory
and reality leads one to wonder, why do these
revenues not raise the standard of living for a
country’s inhabitants? The natural resource curse
hypothesis attempts to explain why the revenues
are not allocated efficiently.
Kojucharov (2007) clearly explains the theory behind the natural resource curse hypothesis.
“Time after time, countries exporting resources
such as oil and diamonds have seen enormous
amounts of revenue pass through their hands, yet
have emerged with fragile economies in which
resource wealth has exacerbated the very problems it was envisioned to solve.” The curse is essentially broken down in to two categories. Kojucharov calls them the Economic Mechanisms
(elsewhere referred to as the Dutch disease) and
the Behavioral Mechanisms (also known as the Nigerian disease).
With the Dutch disease, the natural resource export causes a high volume of revenue
to flow into the country, raising demand, which
drives up prices, causing increased cost of living
(assuming that revenues are not evenly distributed). Domestic goods become more expensive
than similar goods produced abroad, causing
an appreciation of the real exchange rate and
reducing the competitiveness of the domestic
goods on the world market. The Dutch disease
also makes resource exporting countries vulnerable to changes in market prices which can lead
to budget deficits if the country does not save
“boom” profits to cover “bust” spending (Kojucharov 2007). It is also characterized by an inef-

ficient allocation of resources towards the primary
sector, preventing growth of the manufacturing
and services sectors (Zenthofer 2011).
In a present-day example of the Dutch
disease, Zenthofer (2011) compares Mauritius to
Trinidad and Tobago- two countries with very similar histories, ethnic compositions, and resource
endowments. He found that Mauritius’ decision
to diversify has led to a “relatively rich and stable economy,” while Trinidad and Tobago, which
relies on natural gas revenues, suffers from lower
research and development, a less stable government, and low prospect for future growth.
On the other hand, the Nigerian disease
deals with fiscal mismanagement of governments. Kojucharov cites a “mountain-top resort
in Venezuela and an extravagant new airport in
Saudi Arabia” as examples of governments investing resource revenues in high-budget, low-return
infrastructure projects that give the impression of
growth and development without actually helping the people. This type of project can quickly
deplete government funds and lead to deficits.
Additionally, the “rentier state theory” explains
that, once a government has substantial resource
revenues, it has no need to tax its people. In this
way, the people who would be taxpayers have
less leverage to hold the government accountable, leading to decreased transparency. This
sets the stage for corruption and rent-seeking,
which takes money away from vital sectors like
education and health. The combination of the
Dutch and Nigerian diseases often makes the
people worse off than before the discovery of the
abundant natural resources (Kojucharov 2007).
As shown in Section IV of this paper, corruption is
a serious problem in African countries. This lends
evidence to the hypothesis that, if there is a resource curse in these African nations, it is probably from the Nigerian disease.
In African nations, the electrical grids are
often unreliable and not large enough to serve
a majority of the population. Especially in underdeveloped nations, this scarcity makes electricity a very valuable resource. A few of the more
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developed countries have learned to produce
electricity efficiently enough to export it to the
surrounding countries. As the export of electricity
should bring substantial revenues into a country
and as it is derived from natural resources, I wondered if it too could cause a resource curse. This
study aims to determine whether, by means of a
resource curse, electricity export revenues negatively impact corruption and quality of life in Africa.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A number of recent studies have found
that the Nigerian disease is present in many of today’s economies. In an empirical study, Williams
(2010) shows that resource rich countries are less
transparent, that reduced transparency stems
from resource revenues, and that the revenues
have a negative effect on economic growth.
Avom (2010) finds that Central and Sub-Saharan
African countries who rely heavily on natural resources suffer from larger inequalities, smaller human capital development, and smaller revenue
growth.
If the results of my study indicate that a resource curse is negatively impacting the people
of Africa, there are a few policies that could combat the curse or prevent it in the future. Several
studies have examined how to avoid the natural
resource curse. Voigt (2011) points to the “Alaskan solution” in which Alaskan residents receive
a portion of oil revenues each year. This holds
public officials accountable and has been proposed to ensure that Libya’s new government
can avoid the corruption that has plagued its
predecessors. Kojucharov (2007) describes a
World Bank plan that was supposed to prevent a
resource curse in Chad. In the Revenue Management Plan (RMP), Chad’s oil revenues were kept
in an offshore account, introducing them gradually to avoid appreciation of the real exchange
rate; surplus revenues were kept in a stabilization
fund, to keep suppliers immune to market price
changes; a large portion of revenues were given
to the health, education, rural development, and
water/resource management sectors to ensure
that the funds were not misused for public gain;
and two programs were initiated to provide the
citizens of Chad technical and financial training.
Although the RMP failed, due to the Chadian
government’s unwillingness to allow an outside
entity to control its revenues, it provided valuable
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ideas for avoiding the curse. Avom (2010) suggests government investment in manufacturing to
promote diversification of central and Sub-Saharan economies. Pegg (2010) explains that, while
Botswana’s economy is based on diamond revenues and is unlikely to diversify, its emphasis on
saving and investing in infrastructure have led to
a stable economy with a relatively high standard
of living. Hammond (2011) suggests that Venezuela’s decision to use oil revenues to invest in human and physical capital and social welfare is
the “cure for the disease.”
Oil and mineral revenues are the commonly cited sources of the resource curse. There
exists a gap in the literature of alternate sources
that have not been examined. Thus, this study
adds to existing literature by examining electricity exports, a previously unexplored cause of the
curse, one that is derived from natural resources
rather than a resource itself. The study also hopes
that a solution to poverty may be easier to find
from increased knowledge of its causes.
III. DATA
The data set contains information from
25 African countries from 2005-2008, providing
100 observations. The countries were chosen by
availability of necessary data, which could have
resulted in an unrepresentative sample if, for example, there was incomplete data for the poorest, smallest, or most corrupt countries. However,
the existing data set contains a geographically
diverse set of countries as seen in Table 1 on the
next page. The set also contains six net exporters
of electricity, seven net importers, seven countries
that neither export nor import, and five that are
net exporters in some years but net importers in
others.
The data used comes from four separate
sources: the Human Development Index from the
UNDP (2011), the CIA World Factbook (2011), the
World Development Indicators from the World
Bank (2011), and the Worldwide Governance Index (2011) from the World Bank. The Human Development Index (HDI) takes a value between 0
and 1, and uses four indicators (life expectancy at
birth, mean years of schooling for adults, expected years of schooling for children, and Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, to measure three
dimensions of human welfare: health, education,
and standard of living. The HDI statistics are all
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contained in the UNDP’s
Human Development Report which “requires the
highest standards of data
quality, consistency and
transparency” (http://hdr.
undp.org). In addition to
the HDI, values for GNI per
capita and mean years
of schooling were found
through the UNDP’s Human Development Report
(2011).
The
CIA
World
Factbook (2011) contains
detailed country profiles.
These profiles contain information about the government, people, geography,
and economy of individual countries. The key
variables from this source
were electricity exports
and imports, measured in
kilowatt hours per year.
The World Bank’s
World Development Indicators (2011) contains
data from 209 countries for
the past fifty years. While
there are over one thousand indicators, those used
in this project include: life
expectancy at birth, electricity production, oil exports, and mineral exports.

Table 1: Description of countries included in data set
Countries by
region

Electricity Net
Export/ Import

Control of
Corruption Index

Human
Development Index

Algeria

Importer 2 years,
Exporter 2 years

-0.44 to -0.4

0.65 to 0.67

Egypt

Exporter

-0.68 to -0.55

0.59 to 0.61

Libya

Neither

-0.91 to -0.8

0.73 to 0.74

Morocco

Importer

-0.31 to -0.21

0.54 to 0.56

Sudan

Neither

-1.47 to -1.13

0.36 to 0.37

Tunisia

Importer 1 year,
Exporter 3 years

-0.04 to 0.03

0.65 to 0.67

Benin

Importer

-0.94 to -0.35

0.42 to 0.43

Côte d’Ivoire

Exporter

-1.3 to -1.14

0.38 to 0.40

Nigeria

Exporter

-1.28 to-0.84

0.40 to 0.42

Senegal

Neither

-0.47 to 0

0.39 to 0.41

Togo

Importer

-1.13 to -0.75

0.39 to 0.42

Angola

Neither

-1.36 to -1.24

0.38 to 0.40

Cameroon

Neither

-1.2 to -0.91

0.44 to 0.45

Democratic
Republic of
the Congo

Exporter

-1.54 to -1.27

0.22 to 0.24

Gabon

Neither

-0.98 to -0.51

0.63 to 0.64

Republic of
the Congo

Importer 3 years,
Exporter 1 year

-1.11 to -1.07

0.47 to 0.48

Ethiopia

Neither

-0.77 to -0.62

0.29 to 0.32

Kenya

Importer 3 years,
Exporter 1 year

-1.02 to -0.88

0.44 to 0.46

Mozambique Exporter

-0.61 to -0.47

0.26 to 0.28

Tanzania

Importer

-0.78 to -0.28

0.37 to 0.39

Zambia

Exporter

-0.81 to -0.45

0.36 to 0.38

Zimbabwe

Importer

-1.37 to -1.34

0.12 to 0.16

Botswana

Importer

0.88 to 1.07

0.60 to 0.62

Namibia

Importer

0.17 to 0.54

0.58 to 0.60

South Africa

Importer 1 year,
Exporter 3 years

0.22 to 0.58

.058 to .059

Northern Africa

Western Africa

Central Africa

Eastern Africa

Southern Africa

Finally, the Worldwide Governance Index
(2011) contains a Control of Corruption Indicator
that will be used to determine whether electricity exports cause increased corruption. The index “captures perceptions of the extent to which
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption as
well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests” (http://info.worldbank.org). Each
country is given a governance rating between
-2.5 and 2.5, with the highest scores indicating the
least corrupt governments. The rating for each
country comes from a specific set of sources. For
example, Angola was rated by twelve sources, in-

cluding The African Development Bank Country
Policy and Institutional Assessments, Global Integrity Index, Economist Intelligence Unit, and nine
other expert sources.
The following table, Table 1, contains descriptions of the twenty-five countries included in
this study. Attributes included are: geographic
region, whether the country is a net exporter or
importer of electricity, the country’s highest and
lowest values for CCI, and the highest and lowest
values for HDI. Table 1 shows that there is likely
a connection between standard of living and
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geographic location. For example, all
of the Western African countries have
nearly identical values for HDI. Additionally, the data for Southern Africa
suggests a correlation between corruption and standard of living. Southern Africa is the only region with consistently positive CCI values and the only
region in which each country has an
HDI greater than 0.50.

Table 2: Key variables for Model 1
Variable

Description (Unit of measurement)

Expected
Sign

Dependent
Variables
CCI

Measure of corruption

N/A

Independent
Variables
LE

Life expectancy at birth (years)

+

YSCHOOL

Mean years of schooling (years)

+

GNI Per Capita (2008 dollars)

+

Net Electricity Exports/ Total Electricity Production
(kilowatt hours)

-

GNIPC
ELEC

IV. EMPIRICAL DESIGN
OIL
Takes value of 1 if country exports oil, 0 if not
Of the twenty-five countries in
MINE
Takes
value
of
1
if
country
exports
minerals,
0
if
not
this sample, ten are considered to be
“very corrupt,” with CCIs lower than
Table 3: Key Variables for Model 2
negative one, for at least two years.
Variable
Description
ExpectOnly three of the twenty-five countries
ed Sign
have CCIs greater than one. Clearly,
Dependent A measure of human development, accounting for
N/A
corruption is widespread in African Variable: HDI
income, schooling, and life expectancy
countries. Two separate Ordinary Least Independent
A measure of corruption, with positive values
Squares (OLS) regressions will be used Variable: CCI
associated with low levels of corruption
to test this study’s hypotheses about
that electricity exports cause increased corrupthe Nigerian disease. The first regression tests the
tion, and Model 2 demonstrates that corruption
hypothesis that electricity exports increase cornegatively impacts the standard of living, then by
ruption in Africa, and the second regression tests
the transitive property one can say that electricity
the hypothesis that this corruption leads to deexports cause a reduced standard of living. If this
creased quality of life.
is the case, a resource curse may be to blame.
H1: Electricity exports cause increased corruption in Africa.
H2: Increased corruption reduces standard of living in Africa.

Model 1 will determine whether electricity exports cause corruption, while controlling for
human development. The dependent variable is
CCI. The effects of electricity exports are measured by ELEC, which is the ratio of net electricity exports to total electricity produced. ELEC,
OIL, and MINE are dummy variables that take the
value of one if a country exports oil or minerals.
ELEC, OIL, and MINE test for the resource curse.
Controls for the level of human development, life
expectancy (LIFEEXPEC), GNI per capita (GNIPC),
and mean years of schooling (YSCHOOL) are also
included in the regression. The equation for Model 1 follows, and its key variables are explained in
Table 2.

CCI = ɑ + ß1LE+ ß2YSCHOOL+
ß3GNIPC+ß4ELEC+ ß5OIL+ ß6MINE
Model 2 will test whether corruption negatively impacts quality of life for the people of
Africa. The dependent variable is HDI, and the
independent variable is CCI. If Model 1 shows
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The equation for Model 2 is given below and is
summarized in Table 3.

HDI = ɑ + ß1CCI
V. RESULTS
The results for Model 1, which predicts corruption as a function of resource exports and a
control set of variables, are presented in Table
4. It is important to remember, when reading the
results, that CCI values for very corrupt nations
are negative. Therefore, a negative coefficient
in the regression results indicates an increase in
corruption. Interestingly, two of the variables that
control for human development (LIFEEXPEC and
YSCHOOL), are insignificant; however, the third
(GNIPC), is positive and highly significant.
The remaining three variables (ELEC, OIL,
and MINE) test for the resource curse and each
is significant. Interestingly, MINE has the only positive coefficient. This is consistent with the findings
of Pegg (2010), who concludes that Botswana’s
diamond revenues have not caused a resource
curse, thanks to careful government planning
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and a willingness to invest the revenues into the
vital sectors of health, education, and infrastructure. Perhaps the countries with large mineral
deposits, such as Botswana and South Africa are
more equipped to appropriately manage the
revenues, and have turned their resources into a
blessing.

Table 5: Regression Results for Model 2

The coefficient for OIL is negative and
significant, supporting the natural resource curse
hypothesis. This is consistent with the findings of
Williams (2010) and Avom (2010) who find that oil
revenues cause decreased government transparency, allowing funds to be mismanaged. This
finding is also supported by Kojucharov (2007),
who reports that, despite the World Bank’s best
efforts to prevent a resource curse, the Chadian
government misused revenues, preventing economic and human development growth.

***significant at the .001 level
Dependent Variable: HDI
R-Squared: .290
Observations:100
Numbers in parenthesis are T- values

The most important result of this study is
that the coefficient for ELEC is negative and significant. This demonstrates that if a country increases electricity exports, it also increases corruption,
and supports the resource hypothesis that electricity exports, which can bring large revenues
thanks to power shortages in Africa, can increase
corruption, consistent with the Nigerian disease.
Table 5 presents the results of Model 2,
which
tests
Table 4: Regression Results for Model 1 w h e t h e r
Variable
Coefficient
corruption
negatively
Constant
-1.396***
(-3.914)
impacts
standard
ELEC
-.086*
of living. It
(-2.065)
is
imporOIL
-.472***
tant
to
note
(-4.338)
that
corMINE
.488***
rupt
coun(3.941)
tries
have
LIFEEXPEC
.006
n
e
g
a
t
ive
(.931)
values
for
GNIPC
8.746E-5***
CCI,
while
(5.462)
benevolent
YSCHOOL
-.016
countries
(-.508)
have posi***significant at the .001 level
tive values.
*significant at the .02 level
The
coefDependent Variable: CCI
ficient
for
R-Square: .539
CCI
is
posiObservations: 100
Numbers in parenthesis are T-values
tive and significant, indi-

Variable

Coefficient

Constant

.544***
(29.691)

CCI

.132***
(6.319)

cating that an increase in “goodness” causes an
increase in HDI. Conversely, increasing corruption
negatively impacts HDI. It is interesting to note
that the R-squared value for Model 2 is .290, suggesting that nearly thirty percent of the variation
of standard of living is explained by the model.
The results of Model 2 intuitively make
sense. If a government official is corrupt, and
is diverting funds for personal gain, those funds
cannot be used to promote health, education,
or infrastructure. They are also consistent with the
findings of Avom (2010), who determines that corruption that is caused by resource dependency
reduces human capital development and revenue growth. Williams (2010), finds that corruption
prevents economic growth, further supporting the
findings of Model 2.
Combining the findings of Models 1 and
2 demonstrates that electricity exports increase
corruption, and therefore reduce quality of life in
Africa. Model 1 finds that an increase in electricity
exports in Africa causes an increase in corruption.
Model 2 finds that corruption decreases standard
of living. Thus, by transitive property, electricity
exports decrease standard of living, supportive of
the resource curse hypothesis.
VI. CONCLUSION
There exists an electricity shortage
throughout most of Africa. Grids are unreliable,
causing frequent blackouts. Villages without access to power grids are common, and this greatly
lowers quality of life. This shortage causes electricity to be very valuable. Intuitively, the countries that have learned to produce electricity efficiently enough to export it to neighboring nations
should be better off than those who haven’t. That
is, electricity exports should be a ‘blessing’ to the
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people of Africa.
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